The Battle of Leyte Gulf Part 5

 

Gambier Bay and her escorts laying a smoke screen early in the battle.
Photo Credit – U.S. Navy National Museum of Naval Aviation

Kurita emerged unopposed from the San Bernardino Strait and was racing southward heading for Leyte Gulf. At daybreak on October 25, American carriers were sighted on the horizon. Kurita thought he had caught Halsey’s fast carriers with most of their planes down. In fact, Halsey was 300 miles to the north and his planes were taking off to attack Ozawa’s Northern Force. Ozawa radioed Kurita that he was under attack, but Kurita never received the message.

What Kurita had come upon was Rear Admiral Clifton A.F. Sprague’s Taffy 3, one of three groups of escort carriers from Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet assigned to provide air cover and antisubmarine patrol for the Leyte landings, not to attack enemy warships.

When one of his pilots reported seeing enemy forces closing in at 30 knots, Adm. Clifton “Ziggy” Sprague aboard his flagship, the Fanshaw Bay, ordered him to check identification. “Ships have pagoda masts”, came the reply. Sprague wasted no time. He swung his carriers east into the wind at top speed and launched every operational plane, including his fighters. He instructed all ships to throw up smoke screens, alerted his destroyers to prepare for an attack, and radioed for help.

Within minutes, Kurita was dropping salvos all around the American ships. Giant splashes of dyed water rained down in yellow, red, purple, and green on the decks of the jeep carriers. Then Providence intervened; a rain squall appeared, and Taffy 3 ducked into it.

For the next three hours, while Taffy 3 broadcast repeated calls for help and Kinkaid frantically radioed Halsey to return south, Sprague eased southward with his carriers, executing a series of brilliant evasive maneuvers. The counterattacks by his aircraft and seven fighting ships were so fierce, so concentrated, and so effective that the Japanese continued to believe that they were engaging a much bigger force.

Under the shaky cover of the planes, Sprague’s destroyers and destroyer escorts recklessly threw themselves in front of their carriers. They kept on firing torpedoes, and though few of the missiles found their marks, the misses served to delay and distract the faster Japanese ships.

The destroyer Johnston, under the command of Cmdr. Ernest Edwin Evans, a mixed-blood Cherokee Native American from Oklahoma, was in the thick of the hectic fight all morning. She fired her last torpedoes just before being hit by three 14-inch shells. Three small shells tore into the hull. A rain squall covered her while her crew made emergency repairs. When the Johnston emerged from a cloud of smoke, she found herself bow to bow with a Japanese battleship. Firing as she went, she ducked back into the smoke and soon came upon the crippled American cruiser Gambier Bay, which was under attack by a Japanese cruiser. Realizing that the carrier was damaged too severely to flee, Evens rushed in with guns blazing to draw off the cruiser, but the Japanese, intent on larger prey, ignored the Johnston.

At this point, a line of five Japanese warships bore down upon the Gambier Bay and her companion carriers. The Johnston turned around, and Evans fired at the Japanese column. He hit a light cruiser. Japanese shells came from every direction until the Johnston was hit and later sunk. A wounded Evans vanished with his sinking ship. The destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts also went down in this phase of battle while planes from all three Taffys swarmed Kurta’s ships. Then, as the Japanese destroyers turned away, Kurita’s fast cruisers began to close in on Sprague’s carriers. The Gambier Bay was starting to sink, but she continued to blaze away with her single 5-inch gun.

The destroyer and destroyer escorts had the duty to protect the carriers. In this battle, led by the Johnston, they went far beyond the call of duty. After making a smokescreen to obscure the escort carriers, the Johnston charged the oncoming Japanese fleet. Evans waited until his ship got within eight hundred yards of the leading Japanese ship before firing his torpedoes. A torpedo ripped into the Kumano, flagship of one of Kurita’s cruiser divisions.

Admiral Kincaid frantically called on Halsey as he feared the loss of his escort carrier fleet to Kurita’s fleet. Admiral Nimitz followed the progress of the battle from Hawaii by wireless telegraph. He was concerned by Halsey’s dispatch at 8:24 pm the night before: “am proceeding north with three groups.” Kincaid’s desperate pleas the morning of October 25 caused Nimitz to be even more perturbed. He sent a message to Halsey: “Where is Task Force Thirty-Four? Repeat, where is Task Force Thirty-Four? The world wonders.” Halsey felt insulted by Nimitz’s inquiry. Shortly thereafter, he gave the order to change course from due north to due south. He did not expect his fleet to arrive at Leyte Gulf until 8 am the next morning, too late to engage Kurita’s fleet.

A memorial to Sprague and Taffy 3 next to USS Midway (CV-41) in San Diego
Photo Credit – Wikipedia.org

Clifton Sprague’s force put up a gallant and heroic fight against a superior force. Yet, before being annihilated, Kurita’s mighty squadron, astonishingly, was forced to turn and flee northward through the San Bernardino Strait. The sight of Kurita’s departing force left Sprague dumbfounded.

Taffy 3, incredibly, had outfought and outlasted an overwhelmingly superior enemy – and, in doing so, had kept the heavy guns of the Japanese fleet off the American troop transports and MacArthur’s beachhead on Leyte. Admiral Sprague credited Taffy 3’s survival to “our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of the enemy by bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God.”

Sources:

The Pacific War by William B. Hopkins

Return to the Philippine WWII by Rafael Steinberg

The Battle of Leyte Gulf – Part 4

 

Vice Adm. Shoji Nishimura – Photo Credit – Wikipedia

At the same time that Halsey was chasing Ozawa's decoy carriers, the second arm of the Japanese pincers, Vice Admiral Nishimura's Southern Force, was approaching Surigao Strait, the southern entrance to Leyte Gulf. Although he knew that Kurita had been delayed and would not be able to keep the dawn rendezvous in Leyte Gulf, Nishimura steamed ahead on schedule.

Aware of Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura's Southern Force but ignorant of the gaping hole of the San Bernardino Strait, Kinkaid ordered Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf to deploy the U.S. ships in preparation for a night engagement. They would be waiting for Nishimura. As Nishimura's force steamed single file into the southern approaches of Surigao Strait, it was ambushed by several groups of American PT boats, which had been lying motionless in the water so as not to leave wakes that would give away their positions. A few miles farther north, the Japanese entered a more effective prearranged trap: a gauntlet of American and Australian destroyers. As Nishimura's force filed up the center of the strait, the destroyers raced down both sides of it in formation of two or three, firing half salvos of torpedoes at a range of about four miles, and then turning and speeding away before the Japanese guns could find them. Zigzagging and throwing up smoke screens, the destroyers escaped.

The results were devastating. The battleship Fuso blew up and split in two. Nishimura's flagship, the battleship Yamashiro, took hits, and two of his destroyers were sunk. But still, Nishimura came on. Oldendorf prepared to cross the enemy's "T" – a classic maneuver in which one fleet cuts in front of the enemy column in a single-file formation, or battle line. Thus, Oldendorf's battleships and cruisers steamed directly across Nishimura's path, blocking his passage from Surigao Strait to Leyte Gulf.

On the flagship of the cruiser Louisville, Oldendorf held his fire until Nishimura's lead ship closed the range at 15,600 yards. Then, shortly before 4 am, he gave the order to fire. Every ship on the flank forces and the battle line opened at once. Explosions and fires were immediately noticed. After taking several hits, the battleship Yamashiro exploded, then quickly capsized and sank.

By the end of the Battle of Surigao Strait, Oldendorf's ships sank Nishimura's entire fleet, except for one destroyer, which was severely damaged but able to escape. The American losses were thirty-nine killed, 119 wounded, mostly on Captain Smoot's destroyers, the Albert W. Grant, which had been struck by its sister ships and severely damaged. The crew on all the ships sensed that a great victory had been won.

Suddenly, elation turned into real alarm when, over the TBS (Talk Between Ships, a voice radio), the crew heard that the TAFFY groups (the light and escort carriers left behind to protect other entrances to Leyte Gulf) were under attack at close range by Japanese battleships and cruisers.

Admiral Shima arrived in Surigao Strait later that night. At 5:32 am on October 25, Shima radioed Kurita that Nishimura's force had been destroyed. After a brief encounter with American firepower and upon recognizing Nishimura's fate, Shima decided to turn southward and flee the scene.

To be continued. . .

Sources:

Crisis in the Pacific by Gerald Astor

The Pacific War by William B. Hopkins

Return to the Philippines WWII by Rafael Steinberg

The Battle of Leyte Gulf – Part 3

 

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Admiral Halsey’s pilot reported that four of Kurita’s battleships had been severely damaged, that nine cruisers and destroyers had been sunk or heavily damaged, and that the remains of the armada were retreating westward. Halsey assumed that the Center Force was no longer a threat. On the contrary, air attacks by Halsey’s carriers, though damaging to the Japanese fleet, were not the knockout blows reported by the pilots.

Meanwhile, Admiral Ozawa artfully coaxed Halsey to chase him. Desperate to lure the Americans, Ozawa directed his pair of ships that were half-battleship and half-carrier, the Ise and the Hyuga, to run south and find the hostile fleet. U.S. planes scouring the area finally spotted the pair around 4:00 pm on October 24.

At about 5:30 pm, one spotted the carriers of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s Northern Force 300 miles to the north of the San Bernardino Strait. Now, Halsey regarded the Northern Force as the major threat. He did not know, of course, that Ozawa’s four carriers had only a few planes left on board. Lacking that intelligence, he decided on an all-out attack with his entire armada to destroy the Japanese carriers. Leaving not even a destroyer patrol to give warning if Kurita emerged from the San Bernardino Strait, Halsey ordered the Third Fleet north but failed to inform Kinkaid that the vital strait above Samar was being left unguarded. He had swallowed Ozawa’s bait.

Halsey realized that Kurita’s Center force, battered though it was, might yet attempt to enter the gulf. Even before sighting Ozawa’s carriers, he had transmitted to his Third Fleet commanders a stand-by battle plan that set up a separate detachment of fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to confront Kurita. This group of warships formed Task Force 34 under Vice Admiral Willis Lee. The plan was simply an alert, not an operational order for immediate action. To make sure that none of his subordinates misunderstood, Halsey called them on the short-range radio and said, “If the enemy sorties, Task Force 34 will be formed when directed by me.”

Admiral Nimitz and Halsey discussing

 South Pacific strategy

Admiral Kinkaid received a copy of the original message but not the clarifying amendment. Kinkaid assumed that Lee and Task Force 34 were being sent to guard the San Bernardino Strait immediately. On the other hand, Halsey assumed that planes from Kinkaid’s escort carriers would keep an eye on the strait. Halsey also assumed that the Seventh Fleet was strong enough to defeat both the weakened Center Force and the two sections of the Southern Force. Such was the danger of divided command. MacArthur and his Seventh Fleet commander, Kinkaid, believed that Halsey’s first duty was to protect the invasion convoy and the troops ashore. But Halsey and his Third Fleet were responsible only to Nimitz, who had clearly instructed him that his “primary task” was the destruction of the enemy whenever he had the chance. The San Bernardino Strait was not guarded, and no one knew it.

As Halsey and his ships raced north through the night in pursuit of Ozawa’s decoy carriers, Kurita, who had turned his battered but still-potent Center Force around again, was once more threading his way through the interior waterways toward San Bernardino, heading for the open sea and Leyte Gulf.

Sources:

Crisis in the Pacific by Gerald Astor

The Pacific War by William B. Hopkins

Return to the Philippines, WWII by Rafael Steinberg

The Battle of Leyte Gulf – Part 2

 

The bridge of Musashi

The messages from the Dace and the Darter, warning of the advance of Kurita’s fleet, began arriving in Flag Plot aboard USS New Jersey at 6:20 am on Oct. 23. Halsey and his staff pondered the significance of the sightings by the two submarines.

Halsey was not the only fleet commander tracking the Japanese movements. The Seventh Fleet –  “MacArthur’s Navy” – of old battleships and small “jeep” carriers floated off the invasion beach, supporting the landings with gunfire,  strafing, and bombing runs. Aboard his flagship at anchor in Leyte Gulf, Adm. Thomas Kinkaid, the commander of the Seventh Fleet, weighed in with his prediction. In a message to all commanders (MacArthur, King, Nimitz, and Halsey) sent shortly after 10:00 am, Kinkaid suggested that the Japanese warships were headed to the Philippines to stage what Kinkaid called a “magnified Tokyo Express.” Kinkaid suggested that by sea, under cover of night, the Japanese were planning to run reinforcements to their troops battling the invading American forces at Leyte.

To counter the Japanese, Nimitz directed all Pacific Fleet units to cover and support forces of the southwest Pacific in the seizure of Leyte. The 3rd Fleet was directed “to destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine area”. Halsey’s instructions included one sentence that later caused considerable controversy. It read, “In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”

Halsey concluded that the Japanese were running some kind of Tokyo Express but he wondered where were the Japanese carriers. The submarines had spotted battleships but no carriers. Worried about his pilots so exhausted, he ordered one of the carrier groups, Adm. John S. McCain’s Task Group 38.1, to continue to Ulithi to resupply and R&R. McCain’s five ships carried roughly 400 or two-fifths of the Third Fleet’s 1000 warplanes. Halsey felt confident that he had enough to handle a “magnificent Tokyo Express.” He ordered the remaining carrier groups to close on the Philippine shore and prepare for action.

At dawn on Oct. 24, the Third Fleet sent search flights racing to the west, looking for the Japanese ships. At 8:20, came the first report from Lt. Bill Verity, “I see ’em! Big ships!” Two minutes later, Cdr. Mort Eslick gave a count of 25 ships off the southern tip of Mindoro. Halsey took no time in deciding what to do. Officially, Halsey was overall commander of the Third Fleet, but “tactical” control of the fast carrier task force belonged to Adm. Marc Mitscher. At 8:37 am. Halsey, in his best radio voice, commanded: “Strike! Repeat: Strike! Good luck!”

At 8:46 am, Halsey ordered Admiral McCain’s carrier group to reverse course and prepare to refuel at sea. Halsey realized he would need all of his carrier planes. McCain’s force was already 600 miles away. It would take him more than a day to return.

At 8:20, standing on the bridge of the Yamato, Admiral Kurita sighted three American planes to the north. The tension rose on the bridge. After the sinking of the Atago and the Maya the day before, lookouts were on edge and saw periscopes everywhere.

At last, shortly after 10:30 am, the Americans arrived in full force. Thirty planes (Hellcats, Helldivers, and Avengers could be seen breaking tight formation as the bombers commenced their runs. The American planes fearlessly bore in, bombing or just flying low and straight on their torpedo runs.

At noon, the Americans came again. Enormous geysers erupted around the Musashi as a pair of torpedoes buried their heads in her bow. Water was now slowly flooding the Musashi’s forward compartments. From the high bridge of the Yamato, Admiral Kurita watched wordlessly as the American planes broke off their attack and disappeared back over the eastern horizon. He knew that more were coming. Admiral Nishimura, scheduled to advance on Leyte through Surigao Strait, was reporting that he, too, was under attack. Kurita had not heard a word from Admiral Ozawa, whose decoy fleet was supposedly luring away Halsey’s carriers somewhere to the north – though not very effectively, judging from the swarms of American carrier planes descending on Kurita’s ships.

Kurita had been radioing Combined Fleet headquarters in Tokyo and First Air Fleet headquarters in Manila since 8:00 am, requesting air cover, but he had received no response. He decided to send a message to his superiors. It was a request for information in a classically Japanese roundabout way to shame them, but he received no answer either.

Musashi departing Brunei in October 1944

At 3:10 in the afternoon, a fifth wave of American planes descended on the Japanese fleet. It was the biggest attack yet, about a hundred planes. They circled the Musashi. Bomb hits sprayed shrapnel across the decks, cutting down sailors who wore hachimaki “victory” headbands, patterned after the white clothes that ancient samurai wore around their heads, signifying their expectation of death. (American sailors, by contrast, wore metal helmets.) A bomb tore through the bridge of Musashi, killing most of the officers. Admiral Inoguchi was spared. But shrapnel swept across the observation tower where he was, slicing into his shoulder. The ship was by now almost helpless, decks awash.

On the afternoon of Oct. 24, Musashi reeled under a crushing nineteen torpedoes and seventeen bomb blasts. When she finally rolled over and sank, Musashi carried more than 1,000 officers and sailors, almost half the Musashi’s crew to their watery graves. In addition to sinking the Musashi and crippling the cruiser Myoko, the day-long attacks had damaged the Yamato and two other battleships.

On the bridge of the Yamato, Kurita’s staff knew the fleet was in trouble. Captain Otani, Kurita’s operations officer, urged his commander to turn the fleet around. He reasoned that before darkness, the Americans could launch another three attacks. Kurita listened impassively and finally nodded his assent.

Still powerful with his galaxy of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, Admiral Kurita temporarily halted his voyage toward Leyte in hopes that forays of land-based aircraft might drive off the American carriers or protect his fleet from the deadly stings of the American planes. Unfortunately, there were no planes available to support Kurita.

To be continued . . .

Note: Researchers led by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, aboard Allen’s motor yacht, the M.Y. Octopus, had located the imperial Japanese Navy battleship, Musashi, at a depth of approximately 3,280 feet (one kilometer) in Philippine waters on March 2, 2015. The 73,000-ton (66,224 metric tons) Musashi and sister ship Yamato were the largest battleships the world has ever known.

Sources:

The Pacific War by William B. Hopkins

Sea of Thunder by Evan Thomas